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Army National Guard's Role as an Operational Force
"Going forward, we will also remember the lessons of history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past when our military was left ill-prepared for the future."
-President Barack H. Obama 1 The United States is approaching a decision point to address fiscal problems.
Problems such as a balanced budget, debt reduction, reduced spending, increased taxes, and costly long-term benefit programs require a disciplined budget. "The Congressional Budget Office calculates that total government debt will reach 100 percent of GDP by 2023…" 2 The economic environment will severely affect Department of Defense (DOD) budgets and future Army manpower. The DOD is already moving toward budgetary cuts and manpower downsizing.
This paper analyzes and discusses historical trends, insights, and perspectives on ways to maintain an operational ARNG providing the nation a capable option in the current fiscally constrained environment. In order to do this, the paper will first examine the current environment and its effect on future roles for the ARNG. Three specific areas of the environment analyzed are the economy, future threat, and U.S. strategy.
Analysis of historical perspective including conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War will provide possible insights for upcoming fiscal and manpower reductions following the conflict in Afghanistan. Next, recommended solutions to current ARNG operational obstacles will provide direction for future ARNG roles. Finally, the discussion of future roles will provide operational capability and readiness opportunity. Research, data, analysis, and insights will provide possible options to current economic and security risks. The termination of conflict in Afghanistan coincides with planned reductions in Army budgets and manpower. Lessons learned from past conflicts and the downsizing periods that follow those conflicts should provide senior leaders incentive to maintain capability in the ARNG. These lessons also provide a 3 powerful tool to guide budget, manpower, and other downsizing decisions. A smaller AC force, however will require capable ARNG forces. The Army maintaining an operational ARNG force is the right thing for the nation.
Current Environment
Today's fiscal situation in the U.S. will drastically affect the DOD and Army budget. Therefore, discussion of the current economy can provide insight into possible future fiscal implications to the Army. The financial credit rating company, Egan-Jones, dropped the U.S. credit rating twice in 2012 with the latest drop based on moderation from the Federal Reserve hurting the country's credit quality. 4 U.S. economic dominance is also dwindling making the future of the Army more unstable. "The United
States has been the world's largest economy since roughly 1900, but China is likely to overtake America in total economic output no later than 2025." 5 Thus, the current fiscal environment will require necessary and possibly large reductions to the defense budget.
The U.S. federal budget for Fiscal Year 2013 is $3.45 trillion and the defense portion of the total budget is 18%. 6 The discretionary portion of the total budget is 31%
and represents the portion negotiated between the President and Congress each year as part of the budget process. The DOD owns the largest portion of the discretionary portion of the budget at 57%, which will receive fiscal cuts identified in the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). 7 The BCA requires DOD reduction of expenditures by approximately $487 billion over the next decade. 8 By comparison, the Vietnam and Cold War budgets saw a decline of approximately 25%. 9 These are significant reductions and the Army is planning to execute the reductions over a ten year period based on sequestration.
These deep cuts could affect future capabilities and senior leaders such as the 10 Also, every U.S. adversary combined totaled less than 15%. 11 Reduced DOD spending and the ARNG's operational success over the past decade could increase the role of the National Guard in the future. Another result of these deep cuts could be further downsizing the AC force. Therefore, the RC must retain an operational force to meet the nation's security requirements. Future DOD proposed budgets confirm reduced spending and show DOD budgets will not rise again anytime soon.
The budget proposals from FY 2013 through FY 2017 estimate a low of $533 billion in FY2014. This is down from the $691 billion in FY 2010. 12 The proposals recommend significant reductions and require the military to drawdown and cut costs in manpower, force structure, and possibly forward deployments. Historical numbers illustrate the military budget is too large and requires serious cuts. Additionally, the AC endstrength will go from 570k to 490k in the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). 13 The AC endstrength reduction along with potential increased reductions will require an operational ARNG prepared for deployment to meet the need of future threats. Army Posture declares a smaller AC can meet current threats and implies we should provide readiness at the best value based on economic situation. 15 The use of an operational ARNG on a rotational basis will mitigate the risk of a smaller AC, reduce enduring AC requirements, and preserve a smaller AC for crisis response. Discussing future roles for an operational ARNG can provide insight to the size of AC/RC force required.
The ARNG is a capable and valuable option based on the strategic environment.
The ARNG provides 32% of the Army's personnel for about 11% of the Army budget. ARNG to meet readiness requirements. 18 The ARNG is a viable and valuable option based on the announced reduction in AC endstrength, the economic situation, the threat, and strategy. The ARNG can provide a proven operational capability mitigating the risks of a smaller AC force.
Historical Perspective
The Korean, Vietnam, and Cold War conflicts can provide a good understanding of historical manpower reductions, fiscal cuts, and RC readiness after prolonged conflicts. The following historical trend analysis can lead to insights for future Army downsizing and fiscal budget reduction. The analysis will identify high and low budgets during the conflict and following the drawdown period after the conflict. Manpower analysis will include high and low endstrength, which can be years later to draw down the force slowly. An average percentage in fiscal and manpower cuts following each conflict will provide practical data to predict possible future Army downsizing. Next, a discussion of RC readiness for each conflict will provide perspective to today's RC force. Budget and manpower data is available in Table 1 for specific details. In addition, readiness snapshots following each conflict will impart additional perspective. 24 General Creighton Abrams adopted a round out strategy using reserve brigades to round out active divisions in response to readiness and accessibility issues. 25 Access to the RC was difficult due to political will to mobilize the National Guard during the Vietnam conflict. The round out strategy increasingly integrated RC forces with the AC in an attempt to increase access during times of crisis. 32 The historical insights gathered from these trends suggest the DOD budget could decrease further, especially considering current economic conditions. The current economy and reduced government credit rating make predicting future reductions in funding and manpower
following Iraq and Afghanistan difficult. The average low point in DOD spending during drawdown was $383 billion following these conflicts. Comparatively, the projected budget low in FY 2014 will be $526 billion. 33 Since this $143 billion difference is above the historical average, there is a strong case that the DOD budget could decrease further leading to additional manpower reductions. Commander's (CCDR) require ensured access and operational depth from the RC. 36 The ARNG can maintain readiness and provide access to CCDRs using ARFORGEN to meet our nation's security goals.
Tough, realistic training is a necessity but can be an obstacle to readiness. AC and RC. 43 An operational ARNG is a viable and valuable way to maintain capabilities as we drawdown the AC force to 490,000 and possibly much lower.
The ARNG can execute the roles discussed and help the nation meet national security requirements with a projected smaller AC force. Using ARNG forces to execute these discussed roles will maintain readiness and operational experience gained from the past 10 years of conflict. The experience gained during the friction of training, unit alert, unit mobilization, deployment to a theater, execution of the mission, redeployment to home station, and re-integration with families is irreplaceable. ARNG units in the ready year of ARFORGEN should be assigned operational missions such as Kosovo Force (KFOR) rotations. Ready year units can deploy for rotations to CCDR areas of responsibility and execute coalition training, build partner capacity, cooperative security operations, or nation building exercises.
Conclusion
The current environment and historical trend analysis suggest severe fiscal and manpower cuts are not only possible but also are probable. As sequestration takes effect, the Army could downsize an additional 80k to 100k Soldiers from the planned 490k. 44 These reductions are only possible with the ARNG as an operational force. The January 28, 2013 issue of Army Times cites CSA General Odierno advising the Army to plan for the worse. The Army is cutting 30% of its operations and maintenance budget and warns commands to slow spending. 45 The ARNG can provide the additional capability, when needed, for the smaller AC force to focus on global crisis response.
More important, it is the right thing to do for the nation in today's economic environment.
With a reduction in budgets and a smaller AC force, readiness is the key component to maintain the ARNG as an operational force. There are several ways discussed to maintain readiness. Maintaining the ARFORGEN process will allow programmed training, operational deployments, and predicted budgets. To sustain increased readiness, the 2012 defense for 21 st century defense recommends DOD leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model in the RC. 46 Further defining the ARNG role in HS, HD, and DSCA can relieve the AC from these duties. ARNG units can build partner capacity while conducting ODT and SPP missions to lessen the burden on AC forces while providing capability to CCDRs globally.
As noted, Congressional Research Service studies establish maintaining readiness in the ARNG is a better cost benefit than maintaining a large AC force.
Additionally, the QDR states the National Guard can lower overall costs and provide more efficient use of resources in our fiscally constrained environment. 47 Budget reductions and Army draw downs are a reality after major conflicts.
Reductions after Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War all show historical data that predicts the upcoming cuts in the Army. It would be irresponsible to continue receding back to a state of non-readiness for the ARNG. President Obama stated, "Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security." 48 The nation should maintain an operational ARNG to meet the concept of reversibility, cost benefit, and new defense strategy capability requirements. Our global environment is ever-changing yet our force structure is slowly morphing into a 21 st century force. With sequestration signed by the President, the time is right to shift to a smaller AC with a capable RC operating force to meet our national security requirements.
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